In this paper, we propose a new family of multivariate loss functions to test the rationality of vector forecasts without assuming independence across variables. When only one variable is of interest, the loss function reduces to the flexible asymmetric family proposed by Elliott, Komunjer, and Timmerman (2008). Following their methodology, we derive a GMM test for multivariate forecast rationality that allows the forecaster's loss to be nonseparable across variables and takes into account forecast estimation uncertainty. We use our test to study the joint rationality of macroeconomic forecasts in the growth rate of nominal output, CPI inflation rate, and short-term interest rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
F ORECASTING models typically rely on the interaction of a large number of macroeconomic variables to generate predictions. Evaluations of such forecasts are largely conducted one variable at a time (see a survey by Elliott & Timmerman, 2008) . Effectively, such single-variable analysis imposes independence across the variables being forecast. This means, for example, that a forecaster's loss in output prediction errors is assumed to be independent of her loss in inflation prediction errors. This clearly is an undesirable feature of any output-inflation forecast evaluation procedure, especially if we believe that losses are compounded by jointly overpredicting output and underpredicting inflation; in this case, a policymaker might be faced with unforeseen stagflation, an outcome worse than singly missing either prediction.
The purpose of this paper is to study the properties of vector forecasts in a framework that does not impose independence across variables in the forecaster's loss. Instead, we shall assume that the forecaster's objectives can be quantified by a new family of multivariate loss functions that are finitely parameterized yet flexible enough to account for asymmetries in the forecaster's preferences, as well as interactions between the variables being forecast. The proposed family of multivariate losses permits identification and estimation of the parameters of forecasters' objectives and allows testing for rationality of vector forecasts using overidentifying restrictions. Similar to the scalar case, vector forecasts are said to be rational if they are optimal under our multivariate loss; rejections of rationality should then be interpreted as rejections of the joint hypothesis of optimality and the particular functional form of the multivariate loss. 1 Research on forecast rationality has a long-standing history. Since the seminal work of Muth (1961) and Lucas (1973) , rationality in expectation formation has been the cornerstone of economic models. With the availability of survey data such as the Livingston data or the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), the econometric literature on forecast evaluation and rationality testing has seen rapid growth (for an extensive review, see Pesaran & Weale, 2006) . Rationality is tested under a variety of assumptions on the forecasters' objectives. If the latter are quadratic, then testing for rationality simply amounts to testing if the forecast errors have 0 mean and are uncorrelated with any information available at the time that the forecast is made. The most popular form of these tests is the Theil-Mincer-Zarnowitz regression (see, e.g., Theil, 1958; Mincer & Zanowiz, 1969; Figlewski & Wachtel, 1981; Mishkin, 1981; Zarnowitz, 1985; Keane & Runkle, 1990) .
One strand of the literature, however, has argued that asymmetric losses in which positive and negative forecast errors may be weighted differently might better represent the forecasters' objectives (see, e.g., Zellner, 1986; Christoffersen & Diebold, 1997; Batchelor & Peel, 1998; Elliott, Komunjer, & Timmermann, 2005; Patton & Timmermann, 2007a , 2007b . In particular, EKT hereafter) , and Capistran and Timmermann (2009) find evidence for asymmetric loss in the SPF forecasts of output and inflation. 2 Under asymmetric loss, forecast efficiency tests based on the Theil-Mincer-Zarnowitz regressions are biased. EKT (2008) quantify the extent of the bias and its impact on the size and power of standard rationality tests. They propose an alternative GMM-based approach that leads to correct inference regarding forecast rationality and at the same time allows for a parsimonious parameterization of asymmetry in the forecaster's loss.
An overwhelming majority of this work focuses on one variable at a time. Indeed, despite the availability of vector forecasts in surveys, few studies have conducted tests in a multivariate framework. Existing work on vector forecast rationality testing assumes that the losses are additive separable and quadratic in individual variables (see Kirchgässner & Müller, 2006, for example) . Additive separability implies that 1 Another way to test for rationality of forecasts would be to specify an alternative forecast formation model, such as that of adaptive expectations. In that case, rejections of rationality would be in favor of the specific alternative.
2 Those results are obtained under a specific parametric assumption for the forecasters' loss. Quantifying the degree of asymmetry of the forecasters' losses in a nonparametric framework is still an open question. Important nonparametric identification results have been obtained by Lieli and Stinchcombe (2009) , who point out that the "cost of this generality is that [the] identification results are more abstract and do not directly translate into a strategy for estimation and inference." the marginal loss for one variable (say, output) is independent of the others (say, inflation) . In other words, no interactions between the variables are allowed under separability. Perhaps surprisingly, little work has been undertaken on vector forecast evaluation that would allow for nonseparability and asymmetries in the forecaster's loss. This is even more striking as the decision-theoretic literature has long recognized the importance of complementarities in the utility functions of decision makers. The main goal of this paper is to fill this gap.
As our analysis will show, if agents have directional preferences, falsely assuming additive separability of their objectives produces two biases. First, it can alter the results of rationality tests. Second, it may be reflected in a biased evaluation of the forecaster, which means that the econometrician may incorrectly infer a greater degree of directional preference on the part of the forecaster. For example, if the forecaster is truly trying to forecast both output and inflation, then neglecting her inflation forecast objectives when evaluating her output forecasts may result in loss function estimates that are asymmetric, even if the forecaster's loss were perfectly symmetric to start with. In this paper, we argue that incorporating nonseparable losses in some cases can, lessen the degree of asymmetry needed to justify the rationality of multivariate forecasts.
The practical importance of this effect is significant, as it may help explain large degrees of asymmetries often found in the studies of univariate forecasts. For example, EKT (2005 EKT ( , 2008 find that in the context of their flexible loss functions, overpredictions of output are one and a half times costlier than underpredictions, which may be deemed implausible on economic grounds. This paper shows that a joint evaluation of output forecasts, together with other variables such as inflation, may lead to more plausible estimates of asymmetries.
Finally, similar to the methods developed for evaluating single-variable forecasts (EKT 2005 (EKT , 2008 , our forecast evaluation procedure takes into account the forecast estimation uncertainty (see, e.g., West, 1996 West, , 2006 West & McCraken, 1998; McCracken, 2000 McCracken, , 2007 Clark & McCracken, 2001; Clark & West, 2006 , 2007 Corradi & Swanson, 2002 , 2007 Hubrich & West, 2010) . Hence, we explicitly recognize the fact that the observed forecasts typically depend on estimates of the forecasting model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II develops the theoretical foundation for our multivariate approach. Here, we propose a new family of multivariate loss functions and derive their properties. Where appropriate, we emphasize the differences between the separable and nonseparable losses. In section III, we show that the asymmetry parameters of the proposed multivariate loss are identified. Section IV then develops the estimation and rationality testing procedures. In section V, we present a Monte Carlo example that illustrates the properties of the proposed methods. The same section shows that misspecifying losses as separable leads to biased loss function estimates and exacerbates the degree of asymmetry needed to rationalize forecasts. Section VI introduces the data used in our empirical application and presents the results. Section VII concludes. Proof of our main results are relegated to an appendix. Technical details, omitted proofs, and additional results can be found in an online appendix.
II. Multivariate Forecasts and Loss Function

A. Setup
We use bold letters to denote vectors (e.g., z t ) and matrices (e.g., B 0 ). We consider a multivariate forecasting problem in which a forecaster is interested in forecasting future values of an n-vector of interest y t (n 1). Specifically, we let f t+s,t denote the time-t forecast of y t+s , where s is the prediction horizon of interest, s 1. The forecast vector f t+s,t contains all the information in the forecaster's information set F t , which is informative for y t+s . We let F t include lagged values of y t in addition to other covariates used to predict y t+s .
For simplicity, we focus on the one-step-ahead predictions of y t+1 , which we denote by f t+1,t , knowing that all results developed in this case can readily be generalized to any s > 1. 3 Using the standard notation, we let e t+1 denote the n-vector of time-t + 1 forecast errors, e t+1 = y t+1 − f t+1,t . The distribution of y t+1 conditional on F t is denoted by F 0 t (·), F 0 t (y) = P(y t+1 y|F t ) for any y ∈ R n where denotes the usual partial order on R n . We make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. For all t = 1, 2, . . . the conditional distribution F 0 t (·) is absolutely continuous with a continuous density f 0 t (·) such that f 0 t (·) > 0 on R n a.s.-P.
B. Multivariate Loss Function
In this paper, we generalize the flexible family of loss functions introduced by EKT to n-variate forecasts. In the univariate case, given an exponent p, 1 p < ∞, EKT map an asymmetry parameter τ, −1 τ 1, into a nonnegative function of a scalar error e ∈ R; 4 the resulting family of losses is flexible enough to accommodate the absolute value or quadratic losses yet allows them to become asymmetric. We now extend their definition to a vector-valued argument e ∈ R n . For this, let u p denote the l p -norm of any n-vector u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ) ∈ R n , that is, u p = (|u 1 | p +. . .+|u n | p ) 1/p for 1 p < ∞, and u ∞ = max 1 i n (|u i |). Furthermore, let B n p denote the open unit ball in R n : B n p = {u ∈ R n :
Fix a scalar p, 1 p < ∞, and let τ be an n-vector with l q -norm less than unity, τ ∈ B n q , where 1/p + 1/q = 1 with the convention that q = ∞ when p = 1. For any e ∈ R n , we then define our n-variate loss function as follows:
Definition 1 (n-variate Loss). The n-variate loss function L p (τ, e) : B n q ×R n → R, with 1 p < ∞ and 1/p+1/q = 1, is defined as
When p = 1, the multivariate loss L 1 (τ, e) can be used to define the geometric quantiles of the n-vector e, as proposed in Chaudhuri (1996) , for example. In a sense, L 1 (τ, ·) is a multivariate extension of the univariate "check" (or "tick") loss, which is well known in the literature on quantile estimation (Koenker & Bassett, 1978) . When p > 1, the expression of the n-variate loss L p (τ, ·) is entirely novel and not yet seen in the literature. We start by establishing some of its useful properties:
Proposition 1. Let L p (τ, e) be the n-variate loss in definition 1. Then the following properties hold: (i) L p (τ, ·) is continuous and nonnegative on R n ; (ii) L p (τ, e) = 0 if and only if e = 0 and lim e p →∞ L p (τ, e) = ∞; (iii) L p (τ, ·) is convex on R n .
A proof of proposition 1 is in the appendix. The shape of the n-variate loss L p (τ, ·) is characterized by the exponent p, 1 p < ∞. On the other hand, the n-vector τ quantifies the extent of asymmetry in L p (τ, ·). When τ = 0, the n-variate loss in equation (1) reduces to e p p , which is symmetric. On the contrary, for a nonzero τ, the magnitude of τ (given by τ q ) measures the extent of deviation of the n-variate loss from the symmetric case; the direction of this deviation is determined by the direction of τ. In a sense, both the direction and the magnitude of the n-vector τ influence the degree of asymmetry in the forecaster's loss. 5 When the variable of interest is of dimension n = 1 and the forecasts are univariate, the loss in equation (1) becomes L p (τ, e) = [|e| + τe]|e| p−1 .
Letting τ = 2α − 1 so that 0 < α < 1 and p 1 as in EKT, the loss reduces to
where 1:R → [0, 1] denotes the indicator function: 1(u) = 0 if u < 0, 1(u) = 1 if u > 0, and 1(0) = 1 2 (Bracewell, 1999) . 6 In the univariate case, this flexible loss family includes (a) squared loss function L 2 (0, e) = e 2 , (b) absolute deviation loss function L 1 (0, e) = |e|, as well as their asymmetric counterparts obtained when τ = 0 (or α = 1/2), which are called (c) quad-quad loss L 2 (τ, e), and (d) lin-lin loss L 1 (τ, e). 5 The two middle plots in the left panel of figure 1 illustrate this point. The plots are obtained when τ = (0, −0.5) and τ = (0.4, −0.3), respectively. In both cases, τ 2 = 0.5. However, the directions of the two asymmetry vectors are different, resulting in different bivariate losses. 6 Similarly, we use sgn : R → {−1, 0, 1} to denote the sign function:
C. Asymmetry and Dependence Properties
In order to gain further insight into the features of the loss L p (τ, ·), we consider in more detail the case that n = 2. In the bivariate case, the forecaster cares about the magnitude and the sign of her errors e 1 and e 2 , committed when jointly forecasting two variables of interest y 1 and y 2 . In particular, when p = 2, we have L 2 (τ, e) = e 2 1 + e 2 2 + (τ 1 e 1 + τ 2 e 2 ) e 2 1 + e 2 2 1/2 .
The iso-loss curves corresponding to L 2 (τ, e) = constant, where e = (e 1 , e 2 ) and τ = (τ 1 , τ 2 ) , are as plotted in figure 1 . Note that unless τ 1 = τ 2 = 0, the loss L 2 (τ, e) is nonseparable, and we have
for general values of the forecast errors. In other words, the bivariate loss differs from a simple sum of the individual quad-quad losses. This property generalizes to other values of the shape parameter p, as well as to higher dimensions. If p is strictly greater than 1, then L p (τ, e) will in general differ from the sum of coordinate-wise univariate losses L p (τ 1 , e 1 ) + . . . + L p (τ n , e n ). Hence, minimizing the n-variate loss L p (τ, e) will in general produce an optimal n-vector e * whose coordinates e * i do not necessarily each minimize L p (τ i , e i ). In other words, L p (τ, e) captures not only the asymmetry but also the dependence between different coordinates of e.
In the special case in which the forecaster's loss is symmetric so τ = 0, the n-variate loss becomes additively separable. That is, L p (0, e) reduces to L p (0, e 1 ) + . . . + L 1 (0, e n ) for any value of p 1.
III. Multivariate Forecast Rationality Condition
We now define multivariate forecast rationality. Similar to the single-variable case, an n-variate forecast vector is said to be rational if it minimizes the expected value of the n-variate loss L p in equation (1). Since the information sets available to the forecasters change over time, the expectation of the loss is conditional on F t . Hence, any rational forecast necessarily satisfies a set of orthogonality conditions implied by the first-order condition of the expected loss minimization. The key idea put forth in EKT is to use the forecast rationality condition to back out the forecaster's loss function parameters. We now extend this idea to the multivariate case and establish global identifiability of the asymmetry parameter τ given the shape parameter p.
Hereafter, we shall focus on the asymmetry parameter τ alone; in other words, all our results are conditional on the shape parameter p, which will be held fixed in all that follows. 7 Figure 1 .-Contour plots of the bivariate loss L 2 (τ, ·) with τ(τ 1 , τ 2 ) (left), and of the sum of univariate losses
A. Rationality Condition
Throughout the paper, we assume that the forecaster's n-vector optimal forecasts of y t+1 , forecasts, which we denote f * t+1,t , satisfy the following rationality condition:
is the n-variate loss function with parameter τ 0 ∈ B n q and 1/p + 1/q = 1, 1 p < ∞ given, as defined in equation (1).
When assumption 2 holds, we say that the multivariate forecasts {f * t+1,t } are rational under the multivariate loss L p . Implicit in assumption 2 are several important properties:
(a) the forecaster is an expected loss minimizer; 8 (b) when constructing her optimal forecasts, the forecaster has in mind a loss function whose argument is the forecast error n-vector e t+1 alone; and (c) the forecaster's loss is of the form L p (τ, ·) given in equation (1) with a true value τ 0 of the asymmetry parameter τ. The shape of the loss p is treated as known.
We now derive a necessary and sufficient condition for multivariate forecast rationality, which provides the basis of our identification strategy. We need the following property: Assumption 3. Given p, 1 p < ∞, and for all t = 1, . . . we have:
The conditions in assumption A3, combined with the convexity of L p (established in proposition 1) ensure, by Lebesgue's dominated convergence theorem, that we can safely differentiate the loss L p with respect to the error e t+1 inside the conditional expectation operator in assumption 2. This yields the following necessary and sufficient condition of multivariate forecast rationality: (
where M = pν p e * t+1 + τ 0 e * t+1 p−1 p
, and for any u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ) we have let
A proof of proposition 2 is in the appendix. While the necessity of the above first-order condition is obvious, the sufficiency result relies on the convexity of the loss L p (τ 0 , ·) established in proposition 1.
B. Identification of Multivariate Loss Function Parameters
Identification of the true value τ 0 of the multivariate loss parameter τ used by the forecaster exploits the orthogonality conditions derived in proposition 2. Given p, 1 p < ∞, consider an F t -measurable d-vector of instruments x t and denote by g p (·; e * t+1 , x t ) the nd-vector-valued function
The key element of our identification strategy is the following: under rationality, {g p (τ; e * t+1 , x t ), F t } is a martingale difference sequence. In particular, it then holds that for every t 1, E[g p (τ 0 ; e * t+1 , x t )] = 0. If for a given p, 1 p < ∞, τ 0 is the unique value of the n-variate asymmetry parameter τ ∈ B n q (with 1/p + 1/q = 1) that solves these nd orthogonality conditions E[g p (τ; e * t+1 , x t )] = 0, then τ 0 is globally identified and consistently estimable using, for example, Hansen's (1982) GMM approach.
Finding primitive conditions for global GMM identification to hold is difficult in general (see Komunjer, 2011) . Rather than simply assuming away the identification problem, we provide primitive conditions for the asymmetry parameter τ to be globally identified when the exponent p is known. For this, we assume that the variables entering the moment function g p in equation (3) satisfy the following properties:
Assumption 5. Given p, 1 p < ∞,
where I n is n × n identity matrix.
We can now state our identification result, whose detailed proof can be found in the appendix. Theorem 1. Let assumptions 1 through 6 hold. Given p, 1 p < ∞, and for any τ ∈ B n q , let
whereτ is any fixed value of the asymmetry parameter τ and
Theorem 1 shows that the true value τ 0 of the asymmetry parameter τ of the multivariate loss L p is globally identified as the unique minimum of the GMM objective function,
whereτ is any fixed value of the asymmetry parameter τ. The proof of theorem 1 exploits the linearity of the moment function g p in τ and the positive definiteness of S(τ). It is worth pointing out that the latter holds globally on the parameter space B n q and not only at τ 0 . 9
IV. GMM Estimation and Testing
The identification result of theorem 1 is the starting point of our estimation and multivariate forecast rationality testing procedures, which we now discuss.
A. GMM Estimation
Having established that the asymmetry parameter τ is globally identified on B n q , we turn to the problem of estimating τ 0 by minimizing an empirical counterpart of Q(τ). It is important to note that the optimal forecast errors e * t+1 used to define Q(τ) are unobservable in reality. Instead, for every t, R t T = P + R − 1, the forecast evaluator observeŝ e t+1 = y t+1 −f t+1,t , which implicitly incorporates all of the forecast estimation uncertainty embodied inf t+1,t . Explicit here is the assumption that the forecaster uses data from 1 to R to compute her first forecastf R+1,R of y R+1 . The estimation window is then rolled on, and data from 2 to R + 1 are used to computef R+2,R+1 . Hence, the evaluation exercise starts at R + 1 and ends at T + 1 = R + P. 10 Whether the forecaster uses one model to forecast all variables of interest or different models for different variables does not alter the validity of the proposed method, provided, however, that all the individual models contain the same conditioning variables. Now, given p, 1 p < ∞, and given the observations
, the GMM estimator of the nvariate loss asymmetry parameter τ 0 , denoted byτ P , can be defined as a solution to the minimization problem:
whereŜ is a consistent estimator of
In order to make sure that the forecast estimation uncertainty does not interfere with our rationality test, we impose a set of restrictions on how the observed forecaster's nvector errors {ê t+1 } T t=R differ from their optimal counterparts {e * t+1 } T t=R :
Assumption 7. For any ε > 0, and every R t T,
It is important to note that assumption 7 does not presuppose any knowledge of the forecasting model on behalf of the forecast evaluator (the econometrician). When the latter has more information about the model used for forecasting, then assumption 7 can be replaced with more primitive conditions. For instance, if the forecaster's model is some smooth data-dependent function of a finite-dimensional parameter β, then a primitive condition for assumption 7 is simply that the recursive estimatesβ t are all consistent for the pseudotrue value β * that minimizes the forecaster's expected loss: β t p → β * (see West, 2006, for example) . Rather than putting restrictions on the underlying forecasting model, we state assumption 7 directly in terms of the forecast errors.
In addition, we need to ensure that appropriate sample averages converge to their expected values. Recall that assumption 4 restricts the heterogeneity of the process {(e * t+1 , x t ) } by guaranteeing that the latter is strictly stationary. We now impose a similar condition on {(ê t+1 , x t ) } and further restrict its dependence structure.
Assumption 8. The process {(ê t+1 , x t ) } is strictly stationary and α-mixing with mixing coefficient α of size −r/(r −2), r > 2, and, given p, 1 p < ∞, there exist some ε > 0, Δ 1 > 0 and Δ 2 > 0 such that
When the forecast evaluator has additional knowledge about the forecaster's information set, then it is possible to state more primitive conditions for assumption 8. For instance, if the forecaster's model is based on a vector of variables w t that are F t -measurable, then because of the rolling nature of the forecasting exercise, her forecast errors are of the formê t+1 = e(w t , . . . , w t−R+1 ). The strict stationarity and α -mixing of the forecast errors is then implied by the strict stationarity and α-mixing of the sequence {w t }. 11 11 If instead of a rolling window scheme, we assumed that the forecasts were constructed using a recursive scheme (i.e., with an expanding estimation sample ranging from 1 to R for the first forecast, then from 1 to R + 1 for the second forecast, and so on), then {ê t+1 } would not necessarily inherit the strict stationarity and α-mixing properties of {w t } and assumption 8 would fail. See West (2006) , for example. Similarly, an assumption of fixed forecasting scheme would make assumption 7 untenable.
In particular, using the fact that {g p (τ 0 ; e * t+1 , x t ), F t } is a martingale difference sequence, a consistent estimator of S is given bŷ
where τ is some initial consistent estimate of τ 0 . As already pointed out, the optimal sequence {e * t+1 } T t=R is in reality unobservable; what the forecast evaluator (econometrician) observes instead are the forecaster's n -vector errors {ê t+1 } T t=R . Given that the forecaster produces forecasts that are close to optimal as quantified in assumption 7, the consistency ofŜ in equation (5) holds, despite the forecast estimation uncertainty.
We are now able to show that our GMM estimatorτ P of the asymmetry parameter τ 0 is consistent: Theorem 2. Let assumptions 1 through 8 hold. Then, given p, 1 p < ∞, we haveτ P p → τ 0 as (R, P) → ∞.
A complete proof of theorem 2 is in the online appendix.
B. Forecast Rationality Test Statistic
Our test for multivariate forecast rationality defined in assumption 2 comes in the form of a J-test. Hence, it necessitates the derivation of the asymptotic distribution of our GMM estimatorτ P , to which we now turn. We start by strengthening our stationarity assumption 4 as follows:
Assumption 4 . The process {(e * t+1 , x t ) } is strictly stationary and α-mixing with mixing coefficient α of size −r/(r − 2), r > 2, and, given p, 1 p < ∞, there exist some > 0,
Above conditions, similar to those stated in assumption 8, ensure that appropriate laws of large numbers and central limit theorems apply. We shall also strengthen assumption 7 by requiring the following:
Assumption 7 . For some small ε in (0, 1/2) we have:
The above condition ensures that the forecast estimation uncertainty, embodied inê, does not affect the asymptotic distribution of our GMM estimatorτ P . Note that Assumption 7 (i) imposes a condition on the relative growth of sample sizes R and P. In particular, this assumption implies that P/R → 0 as both R and P get large. Assumption 7 (ii), on the other hand, strengthens the requirement in assumption 7 by making the latter uniform across the observation window. Finally, we need two additional new assumptions: Assumption 9. Given p, 1 p < ∞, we have:
Assumption 10. The marginal densities f 0 it (·) are such that max 1 i n f 0 it (y) M for any y ∈ R.
We are now ready to state our asymptotic distribution result forτ P , whose detailed proof is in the online appendix.
Theorem 3. Let assumptions 1 to 3, 4 , 5 to 6, 7 , and 8 to 10 hold. Then, given p, 1 p < ∞, we have:
and
The asymptotic normality result of theorem 3 is the basis for our multivariate forecast rationality test. When the dimension of the d-vector of instruments x t used in equation (3) is large enough (d > 1), then a test for overidentification provides a test of the multivariate forecast rationality condition in assumption 2. More formally, we have the following corollary to our theorem 3: Corollary 4. Let the assumptions of theorem 3 hold. Then a test of rationality of the n-vector forecasts {f * t+1,t } under the n-variate loss L p can be conducted with d > 1 instruments x t through the J-test statistiĉ
whereŜ is as defined in equation (5).
The usual test for overidentification can be used to test the hypothesis that the vector forecasts are rational with respect to the information available in the instrument set x t (d > 1) within the class of our multivariate loss functions L p . The test provides an answer to the question whether, for a given set of instruments x t , there exists some value τ 0 for which the forecasts are optimal. Note that n degrees of freedom are used in the estimation of the multivariate loss parameter.
V. Monte Carlo Simulation Results
In this section, we examine the behavior of the GMM estimatorτ P and study the properties of the proposed multivariate forecast rationality test. Moreover, we illustrate the effects of wrongly assuming the forecaster's loss to be separable.
A. Performance of the Proposed Estimator and Test
To match with the empirical application, we focus on a three-variable case, n = 3. We assume that the observables y t are generated from a VAR (1):
Here, ε t is i.i.d. multivariate normal with 0 mean and covariance matrix Σ = 0.01 × I 3 , c = (.01, .01, .01) , and A = 0.5 × I 3 . We construct samples of size T = R + P − 1 after discarding the first 1,000 periods to remove any initial values effects. The forecaster uses a rolling window of size R to construct P one-period-ahead forecasts f t,t+1 that minimize the expected value of the multivariate loss L 2 conditional on the data and a (correctly specified) VAR(1). The observed one-period-ahead forecast is thenf t+1,t =ĉ +Ây t , where
and τ 0 denotes the true value of the forecaster's asymmetry parameter. One thousand Monte Carlo simulation experiments were undertaken for different choices of τ 0 , R, and P. In each simulation, using the methods described in the previous sections, we construct the GMM estimatorτ P for various choices of the instrument set x t . When overidentifying restrictions are present (d > 1), we also perform the J-test of multivariate forecast rationality based on the sequence of observed forecast errors
Panel A of table 1 reports the τ 0 estimates obtained when the instrument set includes a constant only (i.e., x t = 1), so the model is exactly identified. The GMM estimator performs very well overall, even for values of τ 0 different from 0. Note that when τ 0 = 0, the estimator exhibits slight small sample bias toward symmetry (i.e., underestimates τ 0 in absolute value). This table reports average GMM estimates for τ obtained across 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations. Standard deviations are reported in the columns marked SD. The J-test represents the percentage of rejections of the null of rationality at the 5% level. τ0 indicates the true value of τ. R is the size of the rolling window of data used to construct the forecasts, and P is the size of the evaluation sample.
The parameterization of the VAR(1) that generates the data is: N(0, Σ) , c = 0.01 * [1, 1, 1] , A = 0.5 * I3, and Σ = 0.01 * I3.
Panel B of table 1 reports the τ 0 estimates using the instrument set x t = (1, y 1t ) . The GMM estimator still performs well overall with small sample bias that seems smaller in absolute value compared to the just-identified case. Given that the dimension of the instrument is d = 2, there are n(d − 1) = 3 overidentifying restrictions that allow testing whether the rationality of forecasts is compatible with some τ 0 . The last column reports the empirical rejection probability of the proposed J-test. Size is well controlled for combinations of R and P, which are compatible with our requirement in assumption 7 (i). Not surprisingly, there are size distortions when R/P 1 which confirms the importance of controlling how large the out-of-sample period is relative to the in-sample. Additional out-of-sample observations help control the size.
Additional results can be found in panels C and D of table 1 reported in the online appendix. Overall, the findings confirm that small sample bias is less of a problem when more observations are available (e.g., P = 250) and when the ratio R/P is large. Unlike for the estimation, including extra instruments deteriorates the performance of the J-test, which becomes severely undersized as d increases. Those findings are consistent with the so-called many instrument problem that biases GMM in the direction of least squares and thus causes size distortions in the J-test. As is well known, the GMM estimator suffers from large biases when the degree of overidentification becomes large; hence, we would expect the size properties of our J-test to deteriorate whenever the ratio n(d − 1)/P is not close to 0. 12 This finding has important implications for the empirical analysis to follow, as it dictates the maximum number of instruments one can safely use with sample sizes around P = 150, which will be the case here.
B. Effect of Misspecifying Preferences
We now examine the implications of falsely assuming separability of the forecaster's loss. For this, we construct a set of Monte Carlo experiments in which the forecaster's true loss function is our multivariate loss L 2 (τ, e); the forecast evaluation is, however, done under the assumption that the latter is simply the sum of univariate losses L 2 (τ 1 , e 1 ) + . . . + L 2 (τ n , e n ), where τ = (τ 1 , . . . , τ n ) and e = (e 1 , . . . , e n ) . We again consider three-dimensional (n = 3) vectors y t that are generated from a VAR(1): y t = c + Ay t−1 + ε t , with ε t that is i.i.d. multivariate normal with zero mean and covariance matrix Σ. While c = (.01, .01, .01) is kept unchanged, This choice of A and Σ results in highly correlated individual components of the vector y t . We further assume that p = 2 and the true value of the forecaster's asymmetry parameter is τ 0 = (0, −0.7, −0.6) . Hence, the loss L 2 (t 0 , e t+1 ) is highly asymmetric in the second and third components of the forecast error; however, it is perfectly symmetric in the first component. As before, we use a rolling window of size R = 250 to construct P = 150 one-period-ahead forecasts. Table 2 presents the results from 1,000 Monte Carlo replications of the above parameterization using five information sets. The effects of misspecifying the loss as separable when the forecaster has asymmetric preferences and the variables are correlated become evident. Under separable loss, the forecaster appears to have asymmetric preferences for the first variable (withτ 1 ranging from −0.14 to −0.20 according to the choice of instruments) even though her true preferences are symmetric with τ 01 = 0. For the two other variables, misspecification results in more asymmetric estimates for τ 02 = −0.7 and τ 03 = −0.6, withτ 2 andτ 3 ranging from −0.91 to −0.97 across information sets.
These findings have important implications on the interpretation of the univariate rationality test results. For example, consider the findings of EKT (2008) obtained when testing the rationality of SPF forecasts for GDP growth. Using their flexible univariate loss specification, EKT (2008) find the individual α estimates consistent with rationality to be clustered around 0.4. Translated into our setup, this would correspond to τ estimates clustered around −0.2. From this evidence, EKT (2008) conclude (p. 141) that "asymmetry in the loss function is required to overturn rejections of the null hypothesis [that GDP growth forecasts are rational]." Our Monte Carlo experiment offers an alternative interpretation of this finding: the forecasters' losses are perfectly symmetric in their GDP forecast errors; however, those errors are not independent of the forecast errors committed in other variables.
When the true loss is nonseparable across variables, errors in one variable affect the marginal loss in the other variables. To see why this occurs, consider again the three-variable case:
L 2 (τ, e) = e 2 1 + e 2 2 + e 2 3 + (τ 1 e 1 + τ 2 e 2 + τ 3 e 3 ) e 2 1 + e 2 2 + e 2 3 1/2 .
Then,
∂L 2 (τ, e) ∂e 1 = 2e 1 + τ 1 e 2 1 + e 2 2 + e 2 3 1/2 + (τ 1 e 1 + τ 2 e 2 + τ 3 e 3 ) e 1 e 2 1 + e 2 2 + e 2 3 1/2 . Thus, even if τ 1 = 0 (i.e., the forecaster's preferences are symmetric over the first variable), the marginal loss in the first variable ∂L 2 (τ, e)/∂e 1 depends on the remaining errors (e 2 , e 3 ). Wrongly assuming separability (i.e., that ∂L 2 (τ, e)/∂e 1 is a function of e 1 alone) then results in biased estimates of τ.
VI. Empirical Application
We illustrate the performance of our procedure in a situation in which three macroeconomic variables are jointly forecast: growth rate in output (y), CPI inflation rate (π), and short-term interest rate (r). Examples of models using these The percentages of forecasters for whom the null of rationality and nonseparable loss (left), rationality and separable loss (middle), and rationality and separable symmetrical loss (right) could be rejected at the specified levels. The results are obtained by fixing p = 2. The instrument sets are as defined in table 3. variables include Taylor's (1993) interest rate targeting rule, monetary VARs (Christiano, Eichenbaum, & Evans, 1999) and reduced-form new Keynesian models (Clarida, Galì, & Gertler, 2000) . Common to these models is a relationship, estimated or imposed, between output and prices combined with the Federal Reserve's control of short-term interest rates. We would thus expect the forecaster's loss to be nonseparable across variables.
A. Data
Forecast data are taken from the Blue Chip Economic Indicators (BCEI), a compilation of industry forecasts of a number of economic variables. Each month, participating firms report forecasts of the current-or next-year growth rate in output and prices and the current-or next-year average short-term interest rate. Our sample forecasts are from 1976:08 to 2004:12.
We assume that the forecaster's objective is to predict true values and that revisions to the realizations are a more accurate reflection of the true values. Thus, in constructing the forecast errors, we use the latest revision of the variable in question. The realizations are yearly growth rates of GDP, GNP, and CPI inflation. Short-term interest rate realizations are the yearly averages.
Over time, some forecasters leave the sample, while others are added. In addition, firms occasionally fail to report forecasts for any given month. We therefore omit any observation in which forecasts for all three variables are not reported. These observations may affect both the period in which the forecast is made and the information set of the forecaster. In these cases, both observations are omitted. Finally, forecasters with fewer than 80 valid observations are dropped from the sample. This leaves 57 firms, with an average of 171 valid observations per firm.
The set of instruments x t used in implementing our procedure includes combinations of the lagged growth rates of output, inflation, the unemployment rate, and the short-term interest rate. For each month, instruments are a snapshot of the real-time data available at that time. 13 The instrument sets are defined in table 3. As a baseline for comparison, we repeat each test under the assumption of separability and the joint assumption of separability and symmetry. Table 4 illustrates the effect of testing rationality using the nonseparable loss L 2 (τ, e), separable loss L 2 (τ 1 , e 1 ) + L 2 (τ 2 , e 2 ) + L 2 (τ 3 , e 3 ), as well as separable symmetric loss L 2 (0, e 1 ) + L 2 (0, e 2 ) + L 2 (0, e 3 ).
B. Multivariate Rationality Test Results
We report the percentages of forecasters for which rationality could be rejected at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, for each set of instruments. p = 2 is kept fixed in all configurations. For any instrument set, both asymmetric loss functions reject rationality for a lower percentage of forecasters than the separable symmetric baseline. The percentage of forecasters for which rationality is rejected under nonseparable loss is relatively close to that under separable loss. Rationality under separable symmetric loss is, however, overwhelmingly rejected. Interestingly, the smallest percentages of forecasters is found to be rational with respect to the unemployment rate (information set 5). Summary statistics of GMM estimates of τ obtained across forecasters. GNP (y) and inflation (π) are taken as growth rates. The short rate (r) is the three-month T-bill rate. The results are obtained by fixing p = 2. The instrument sets are as defined in table 3. For the first instrument set, means and medians are taken over the entire sample of valid forecasters. For all other instrument sets, they are computed only for forecasters for whom the null of rationality could not be rejected at the 5% level. 
C. Asymmetry Coefficients
For a given specification of the forecaster's loss function, our procedure delivers estimates of the asymmetry parameters (τ y , τ π , τ r ) most consistent with the orthogonality conditions implied by rationality of joint forecasts of y, π, and r.
EKT found that the addition of asymmetric loss alone can increase the percentage of forecasters for which rationality is confirmed. However, for the separable loss functions implied by EKT, this finding often requires substantial directional asymmetry in the forecasters' loss functions. Allowing the forecaster's marginal loss to depend on all of the variables being forecast may ameliorate this problem. Recall that interpretation of the asymmetry parameters (τ y , τ π , τ r ) depends on their values relative to the baseline 0. Values greater (less) than 0 indicate greater losses for positive (negative) forecast errors. Table 5 provides summary statistics for the distributions of the estimated asymmetry parameters across forecasters. For the first information set, x t = 1, we compute the mean and median of the asymmetry parameters for all forecasters with eighty valid observations. For all other instrument sets, the mean and median asymmetry parameters are computed only for forecasters for which rationality could not be rejected at the 5% level. Figure 2 provides graphical representations of one of these distributions.
The joint directionality in preferences is consistent across forecasters. More than half of the forecasters exhibit higher loss when jointly overpredicting output, overpredicting the short-term interest rate, and underpredicting inflation. Each of these directional preferences is associated with an unexpectedly worse economic outcome: lower-than-expected output growth, looser-than-expected monetary policy, and higher-than-expected inflation.
The salient result for nonseparable loss lies in the magnitude of the estimated asymmetry parameter relative to that obtained under separability. We find that the degree of directional asymmetry is reduced once separability is relaxed. To see this, we compute the norm of the preference vector for each forecaster. Because τ = 0 reflects symmetric preferences, the magnitude of τ 2 provides a summary of the overall degree of asymmetry. Table 5 shows mean and median τ 2 obtained under nonseparable and separable losses. For each instrument set, the overall degree of asymmetry required to make the forecaster consistent with rationality is smaller in the nonseparable case. Figure 3 plots the absolute values |τ i | obtained under nonseparable loss against those obtained under separable loss. With few exceptions, the estimates lie below the 45 degree line, indicating a decline in the estimated asymmetry once we allow the loss to be nonseparable. Assuming separability leads the econometrician to infer more directional asymmetry than may actually be warranted.
VII. Conclusion
Recognizing the multivariate nature of most forecasting problems has important implications for the prospects of rational expectations in macroeconomic models. In a univariate setup, EKT (2005 EKT ( , 2008 argue that rationality requires the econometrician to allow forecasters to have asymmetric loss across directional errors for output and inflation. These conclusions are drawn from a model that considers the forecast series in isolation. Our findings show that imposing separability of the forecaster's loss across variables leads to a misspecification that biases the result toward asymmetry.
From a macroeconomic point of view, the preceding argument amounts to the following conclusion: agents account for monetary policy (the short-term interest rate) when establishing their forecasts for output and inflation. The assumption of additive separability in forecast loss is akin to the assumption that forecasters believe output, inflation, and monetary policy are independent. Our findings suggest that in light of the forecasters' expectation of future monetary policy, their predictions for output and inflation appear rational with less directional asymmetry. One final concern, however, is the rate at which directional asymmetry for short-term interest rates is rejected even in the multivariate framework. A number of alternatives to true directional asymmetry can be posited. For example, the loss function may still be misspecified if key correlations are omitted. A second possibility is that the asymmetry is produced by the process by which monetary policy is conducted, that is, monetary policy tightenings are more predictable than easings.
APPENDIX
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Fix p,
and consider the n-variate loss function L p (τ, ·) : R n → R as in definition 1. That L p (τ, ·) is continuous on R n follows by the continuity of the p-norm e → e p and the Euclidean inner product e → τ e on R n . We now establish that L p (τ, e) 0 for every e ∈ R n with equality if and only if e = 0. By Hölder's inequality, we have
where the second inequality uses the fact that τ ∈ B n q so that τ q < 1 .
Hence, e p + τ e > 0 for every e ∈ R n . This implies that This establishes properties i and ii of proposition 1. We now show (iii) that L p (τ, ·) is a convex function on R n -that L p (τ, (1 − λ)e 1 + λe 2 ) (1 − λ)L p (τ, e 1 ) + λL p (τ, e 2 ), 0 < λ < 1, for every (e 1 , e 2 ) ∈ R 2n (see theorem 4.1 in Rockafellar, 1970) . We have L p (τ, (1 − λ)e 1 + λe 2 ) = [ (1 − λ)e 1 + λe 2 p + τ ((1 − λ)e 1 + λe 2 )] (1 − λ)e 1 + λe 2 p−1 p [(1 − λ)( e 1 p + τ e 1 ) + λ( e 2 p + τ e 2 )] (1 − λ)e 1 + λe 2
where the last inequality uses the convexity of e → e p when p 1 and the linearity of e → τ e on R n . We now show that 
where the first inequality uses triangular inequality, the second follows from theorem 19 in Hardy et al. (1952) applied with r ≡ p − 1 and s ≡ 1 (the latter shows that, for every (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ R 2 + and 0 < r < s, we have 
where the first inequality again uses triangular inequality, the second uses the convexity of x → x ρ (ρ 1) on R + , and the third inequality follows from 0 < λ < 1. Combining inequalities (A1) to (A3) then yields L p (τ, (1 − λ)e 1 + λe 2 ) [(1 − λ)( e 1 p + τ e 1 ) + λ( e 2 p + τ e 2 )] e 1 p−1 p + e 2 p−1 p
(1 − λ)( e 1 p + τ e 1 ) e 1 p−1 p + λ( e 2 p + τ e 2 ) e 2 p−1 p = (1 − λ)L p (τ, e 1 ) + λL p (τ, e 2 ),
where the second inequality uses the nonnegativity of e 1 p + τ e 1 and e 2 p + τ e 2 (established in item i of the proposition). This shows item iii and thus completes the proof of proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
For any continuously differentiable real function f : R n → R, we let ∇ u f (u) denote the gradient of f (·) with respect to u: ∇ u f (u) ≡ (∂f (u)/∂u i , . . . , ∂f (u)/∂u n ) .
Fix p, 1 p < ∞, and τ 0 ∈ B n q , where 1/p + 1/q = 1. Differentiating the loss L p (τ 0 , ·) in equation (1), we have ∇ e L p (τ 0 , e) = pν p (e) + τ 0 e p−1 p + (p − 1)τ e ν p (e) e p ,
for all e ∈ R n \E where E = {e ∈ R n : e i = 0 for some i} is a set of points of nondifferentiability of L 1 (τ 0 , ·) which is of measure 0. Note that in the univariate case n = 1, the expression in equation (A4) This last condition, combined with the convexity of L p (τ 0 , ·), which implies that L p (τ 0 , ·) is locally Lipschitz, allows us to interchange the order of differentiation and expectation to get ∇ e E L p τ 0 , e * t+1 |F t = E ∇ e L p τ 0 , e * t+1 |F t .
This, combined with the gradient expression in equation (A4) and with the convexity of the loss L p (τ 0 , ·), shows that the first-order condition in equation (2) is necessary and sufficient for assumption 2 to hold.
Proof of Theorem 1
The result of theorem 1 follows by combining lemmas 5 and 6.
Lemma 5. Let assumptions 1 through 5 hold. Given p, 1 p < ∞, and for any τ ∈ B n q , let Q(τ) ≡ E g p τ; e * t+1 , x t S −1 E g p τ; e * t+1 , x t , with S positive definite. Then τ 0 is the unique minimum of Q(τ) on B n q .
Put in words, lemma 5 gives primitive conditions for the parameter τ 0 to be globally identified by the nd moment conditions E[g p (τ 0 ; e * t+1 , x t )] = 0. The key condition for the global identification of τ 0 to hold, in addition to those given by assumptions 1 to 5, is that the matrix S in the GMM objective function Q(τ) be positive definite. This weighting matrix is usually set to be equal to S ≡ E g p τ 0 ; e * t+1 , x t g p τ 0 ; e * t+1 , x t .
In order to ensure that S is positive definite, we need the covariance matrix of d-vector of instruments x t to be of full rank, stated in assumption 6. Lemma 6. Let assumptions 1 through 6 hold. Given p, 1 p < ∞, and for any τ ∈ B n q , let S(τ) ≡ E g p τ; e * t+1 , x t g p τ; e * t+1 , x t .
Then S(τ) is positive definite.
